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10.1  Introduction 
Over the last decade there has been a growing belief among economists and 
policymakers that the primary objective of monetary policy should be to con- 
trol inflation. Two kinds of arguments are cited. First, experience suggests that 
fine-tuning the economy is not a realistic option and that inflation is difficult 
to lower. By taking preemptive steps to avoid high inflation, a central bank can 
reduce the likelihood of  having to engineer a costly disinflation. Second, a 
central bank that establishes a clear commitment to controlling inflation may 
be able to maintain low inflation for far less cost than if it did not have this rep- 
utation. 
In  this  context German monetary  policy  is  of  great  interest. From the 
breakup of Bretton Woods in 1973 until the year prior to reunification, 1989, 
average annual inflation in West Germany was lower than in any other Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country. Based 
in  large part  on  this historical performance, the  Deutsche Bundesbank is 
known for its commitment to fighting inflation, perhaps more than any other 
central bank. The institutions of German monetary policy, further, appear spe- 
cifically geared toward controlling inflation. Each year since 1974 the Bundes- 
bank has set targets for both inflation and monetary growth. 
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This paper provides a broad-based description of German monetary policy. 
The goal  is to learn  about the  mechanics of maintaining  low inflation,  and 
about the net benefits and costs of doing so. In the end we provide a description 
of how the Bundesbank conducts monetary policy that is based on both a read- 
ing of the historical evidence and a formal statistical analysis of the Bundes- 
bank’s policy rule. 
What makes the general problem of evaluating Bundesbank policy challeng- 
ing is that for much of the last fifteen years the performance of the real econ- 
omy has been mixed. Unraveling the precise role of monetary  policy in this 
performance is a complex issue, one that our analysis cannot fully resolve. By 
closely studying the record of monetary policy, however, we try to shed light 
on the matter. 
Section 10.2 describes the institutions of German monetary policy. Here we 
outline the system of inflation and monetary targeting. As  is commonly under- 
stood by  close observers of the Bundesbank, the targets are meant as guide- 
lines. In no sense do they define  a strict policy  rule. In terms of operating 
procedures,  the Bundesbank  chooses  a path  for short-term interest rates to 
meet its policy objectives, similar in spirit to the Federal Reserve Board. 
Section 10.3  reviews the history of Bundesbank policy since the breakup of 
Bretton Woods. Here our objective is to obtain narrative evidence on how the 
Bundesbank operates in practice. As one might expect, we find that the Bunde- 
sbank is aggressive in managing short-term interest rates to dampen inflation- 
ary pressures, the exception being the period between the two major oil shocks, 
1975 to early 1979. On the other hand, it clearly factors in the performance of 
the real economy in setting rates, though perhaps not explicitly. For example, 
it often cites exchange rate considerations to pursue what closely resembles a 
countercyclical policy. We also find, as have others, that curtailing inflation is 
not a costless process for the Bundesbank, despite its reputation. 
Sections 10.4 and 10.5 supplement the narrative evidence with a formal sta- 
tistical  analysis of Bundesbank policy. Specifically, we attempt to identify a 
policy reaction function that characterizes how the Bundesbank sets the short- 
term interest rate. In general, estimating a policy reaction function involves a 
number of formidable identification issues, as we discuss. We take a two-step 
approach. We first obtain a reaction function by estimating a structural vector 
autoregression (VAR). This approach permits us to formally characterize how 
the Bundesbank adjusts short-term rates in response to different disturbances 
to the economy, using only a minimal set of  identifying assumptions. As  we 
show, the results are highly consistent with the narrative evidence. The disad- 
vantage of this approach is that the reaction function is difficult to summarize 
intuitively because it is based on the entire information set in the VAR. 
Section 10.5 presents the second step. We place additional structure on the 
model to obtain a more conventional-looking reaction function based on infla- 
tion and output objectives. We  estimate a reaction function for the German 365  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
short-term rate that is close in general form to the one developed by  Taylor 
(1993) to characterize how the Federal Reserve Board has set the funds rate 
during the Greenspan era. In particular the central bank adjusts the short-term 
interest rate in response to the  gaps between  inflation  and output and their 
respective targets. One key difference from Taylor is that under our rule the 
central bank is forward-looking in the sense that it responds to expected future 
inflation as opposed to lagged inflation. To form these expectations, our rule 
uses the information about the economy that is contained in the VAR  model. 
Another key difference is that we allow for an asymmetric policy response to 
inflation; that is, we allow for the possibility that the Bundesbank may tighten 
more aggressively when expected inflation is above target than it eases when 
expected inflation is below target. 
Overall, the estimated reaction function does a reasonably good job of char- 
acterizing the path of the German short-term rate over the post-Bretton  Woods 
era. In addition the Bundesbank does appear to respond asymmetrically to the 
inflation gap. Finally, as we show, our modified “Taylor” rule provides a useful 
benchmark to gauge the position of policy at different critical junctures of the 
economy. Taken all together, our results suggest that Bundesbank policy since 
1973 may be characterized as being reasonably similar to Federal Reserve pol- 
icy under Alan Greenspan. 
Section 10.6 offers concluding remarks. 
10.2  Institutions of Bundesbank Policy 
As is commonly presumed,  the overriding objective of German monetary 
policy is to control inflation. The institutional design supports this goal in two 
main ways. First, formal legislation explicitly restricts political influence. Sec- 
ond, each year the Bundesbank clearly articulates an inflation objective and 
then establishes a target for the growth of a key monetary aggregate, based on 
this objective. 
At  the same time  it is important  to recognize  that the system  allows for 
flexibility, The monetary and inflation targets, for example, are only guidelines 
and not legal mandates. Events in the real economy can (and often do, as we 
will see) induce the Bundesbank to deviate from these guidelines, though not 
without some kind of official explanation. 
With  these general observations in mind, we proceed  to characterize the 
institutional design of Bundesbank policy. Section 10.2.1 describes the organi- 
zation and jurisdiction  of the German central bank. Section  10.2.2 discusses 
the practice of  monetary and inflation targeting. Section 10.2.3 describes the 
operating procedures for conducting monetary policy. Here we argue that, de- 
spite the focus on monetary aggregates, short-term interest rates provide a bet- 
ter overall indication of  the  thrust of  policy than  do the  aggregates. In this 
respect there are some strong similarities with U.S.  monetary policy. 366  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
10.2.1 
Much as the experience of  the Great Depression shaped the development 
of  monetary and financial institutions in the United States, memories of the 
hyperinflation influenced the design of the German central bank. Article 3 of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank Act of  1957 empowers the German central bank 
to regulate the amount of currency and credit in circulation with the aim of 
safeguarding the currency. To ensure that this goal is feasible, legal mandates 
free monetary policy from the demands of fiscal policy. To avoid the mistakes 
of the hyperinflation, article 20 of the act prohibits the central bank from fi- 
nancing government deficits. Decisions on the course of monetary policy are 
made by a council that is independent of the federal government. Article 12 of 
the act makes this independence explicit.' 
The formal body that sets monetary policy is the Central Bank Council, 
which closely resembles the federal Open Market Committee. It consists of 
the Bundesbank Board (analogous to the Federal Reserve Board) and the presi- 
dents of the German Land central banks (analogous to the presidents of  the 
regional reserve banks). The Bundesbank Board consists of a president, vice 
president, and up to six other board members. The federal government nomi- 
nates the board members, while the state governments nominate the presidents 
of the Land central banks. Terms are for eight years. Except for the constraint 
of mandatory retirement, council members typically are invited to serve a sec- 
ond term. The long terms are justified as a means to insulate the governing 
body from political pressures. 
From the perspective of political independence, any differences between the 
institutional setup of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are not dramatic. 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) assign the German central bank a 
slightly higher independence rating than  its  U.S.  counterpart because the 
Bundesbank president is guaranteed a longer term than is the Federal Reserve 
Board chair (eight years versus four years.) 
Finally, the Bundesbank's jurisdiction is not completely independent of the 
federal government. The latter has discretion over exchange rate agreements. 
At least in practice, however, the government cannot force the Bundesbank to 
maintain agreements that threaten domestic price stability. Before Germany 
entered the European Monetary System (EMS), for example, the Bundesbank 
won  a provision from the federal government that it could deviate from the 
exchange agreement if  it was deemed necessary to do so in order to maintain 
low inflation (Neumann and Von  Hagen 1993). In effect this meant that the 
Bundesbank assumed a clear leadership role in the EMS. At least for a period 
Central Bank Design and Jurisdiction 
1. Article  12 encourages the Bundesbank to cooperate  with the economic objectives of  the 
federal government, but not to the extent that doing so may conflict with the overriding goal of 
price stability. The article explicitly forbids the federal government to formally participate in mon- 
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of time, this was a suitable arrangement for the other countries involved. Be- 
cause of its reputation the Bundesbank served as an informal nominal anchor. 
On numerous occasions other central banks simply followed the response of 
German interest rates to exogenous shocks.2 
10.2.2  Monetary and Inflation Targeting 
The Bundesbank is widely known for its practice of setting monetary tar- 
gets. Perhaps its most distinctive feature, though, is its simultaneous practice 
of setting inflation targets. Inflation targeting is slowly increasing in popularity 
among central banks, and is currently a popular subject of  academic discus- 
sion. It is perhaps  not  widely appreciated, however, that always underlying 
Germany’s announced monetary target is an explicitly stated goal for inflati~n.~ 
This contrasts with the United States, for example, where in the past monetary 
targets have been set without any explicit public rationalization. 
Also not widely appreciated is the flexibility built into the policy rule. There 
is no blind commitment to hitting the monetary  target^.^ The view is that the 
monetary policy will be judged on its inflation  scorecard, and it will not be 
penalized for missing monetary targets if inflation is under control. In addition 
there has not been a unilateral focus on inflation. As we show later, on a num- 
ber of  occasions, the Bundesbank has tolerated deviations from the targets in 
order to pursue what may be construed as a countercyclical p01icy.~ 
The Targeting Procedure 
The practice of targeting began in 1975, after the breakup of Bretton Woods. 
The Bundesbank felt the need to maintain some kind of explicit nominal an- 
chor to guide policy in the post-Bretton  Woods era. The procedure works as 
follows: Each year the Bundesbank first establishes a goal for inflation. A tar- 
get growth rate for a designated monetary aggregate is then established that is 
meant to be consistent with the inflation goal. In particular the money-growth 
2.  Uctum (1995). among others, provides some formal evidence for the Bundesbank‘s leadership 
role in the EMS. The paper identifies a clear causal relationship between German short-term inter- 
est rates and the short-term interest rates of other countries. 
3. Bundesbank officials are resistant to equating their selection of an inflation goal with inflation 
targeting. They maintain that the ultimate target is price stability. Any deviation of the inflation 
goal from price stability is due to what they term “unavoidable” factors. 
4. The notion that the targets serve as guidelines rather than as rigid mandates is a prominent 
theme in many studies of Bundesbank behavior. See, for example, Bemanke and Mishkin (1992); 
Kahn and Jacobson (1989); Trehan (1988); Von Hagen (1994). In addition, Bundesbank officials 
themselves are rather open about the flexibility inherent in the system. For example, to quote, 
Otmar Issing (1995,5), the current head of the Bundesbank’s research department, “Even in Ger- 
many, where a high degree of stability of financial relationships was observed, the central bank 
has never seen fit to transfer monetary targeting to an ‘autopilot,’ as it were.’’ 
5.  Even in its official publications, the Bundesbank makes clear that circumstances may justify 
deviating from the targets. It states that, while the monetary targets “include a recognizable steady- 
ing element, they are not meant to preclude any reaction to the developments of economic activity, 
exchange rates, costs, and prices” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1989,99). 368  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
target  is backed  out of  a  conventional  quantity-theory  equation  that  links 
money, velocity, prices, and output. As inputs into the equation, the Bundes- 
bank uses the target rate of inflation and estimates of the trend growth of veloc- 
ity and the trend growth of capacity output. The motive for using estimates of 
trend as opposed to near-term output and velocity growth in the calculation is 
to avoid trying to fine-tune inflation.6 Instead, the objective is to maintain a low 
long-run average inflation rate. By clearly signaling its intent to gear policy 
toward achieving this long-term inflation goal, the Bundesbank seeks to influ- 
ence private-sector  wage and price adjustments.’ 
Originally, a fixed money target was announced. After two years, however, 
this was changed to a fixed range. The move to the range reflects the reality 
that the monetary aggregate is difficult to tightly regulate and that both output 
and velocity may deviate considerably from trend in the short run. Additional 
flexibility is provided by a midyear review of targets, which allows changing 
the targets in light of new information. The Bundesbank has made use of this 
option only once, however, during  1991, in the early stages of  reunification. 
Finally, the targets are fixed for a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter growth rate 
of  a variable.  Originally,  they  were  from December  to  December, but  the 
monthly pinpointing introduced too much transitory noise. 
How  does the Bundesbank  set its inflation target? The official  goal is to 
keep inflation from rising above its “unavoidable” level. Using this criteria, the 
Bundesbank has set a goal of 2% annual inflation for each year since 1986 (see 
table 10.1). The Bundesbank refrains from reducing the target to 0% because 
the official price index may overstate the true inflation rate since it tends to 
undercompensate for improvements in the quality of goods. Fixing the target 
at 2% ensures that measurement error in the price index will not inadvertently 
induce the Bundesbank to tighten (Issing 1995). 
In the past the Bundesbank has also taken into account stabilization consid- 
erations in fixing the target inflation rate, at least implicitly. In the initial year 
of targeting, 1975, it set the inflation goal at 4.5%. This objective was picked 
with the aim of gradually reducing inflation over time. At the time, Germany 
(like the United States) was experiencing stagflation, due to the oil shocks of 
1973 and  1974. The target was reduced to 2% gradually over time. The fact 
6.  Indeed, Bundesbank officials state explicitly that the central bank does not try to fine-tune 
either inflation or money growth in the short term. To  quote Issing (1995, 8) again: “in the short 
term the relationship between the money stock and the overall domestic price level is obscured by 
a host of influencing factors. Any attempt at keeping the money stock on the desired growth path 
at all times would therefore inevitably spark off considerable interest rate and exchange rate fluc- 
tuations, provoke shocks to the trend of economic activity and hence cause unnecessary economic 
costs in the shape of adjustment on the part of economic agents. Accordingly, the Bundesbank has 
time and again pointed to the medium term nature of its strategy which is aimed at cyclical stabili- 
zation.” 
7. In particular the Bundesbank states that an important purpose of the targeting procedure is to 
“make the aims of  monetary policy clearer to labor and management, whose cooperation is essen- 
tial  if  inflation  is  to  be  brought  under  control  without  detrimental  effects  to  employment” 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1989, 97). 369  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
Table 10.1  History of Money-Growth  Targets and Unavoidable Inflation 
Money Growth  Inflation 
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Sources: Kole and Meade 1994; Von Hagen 1994 
Notes: From 1975 to 1984 the Bundesbank announced a rate of “unavoidable” inflation as its input 
to the determination of money-growth targets. From 1985 to 1993 the objective was the rate of 
inflation consistent with “price stability.” 
that the target was not set lower initially suggests that, while controlling infla- 
tion may be its primary goal, the Bundesbank is not willing to do it at any cost.* 
As  further evidence of  the Bundesbank’s pragmatism, the previous year’s 
performance of inflation relative to its target does not directly affect the current 
target choice. The targets are simply rebenchmarked, implying that the Bunde- 
sbank accommodates any overshooting in the previous year. It thus does not 
try to target a path for the price level. We  return to this point in section 10.3, 
during the historical review of monetary policy. 
Choice of  a Monetary Aggregate 
What determines the monetary aggregate that the Bundesbank targets? The 
desired aggregate must  satisfy two conventional criteria. First, it should be 
reasonably controllable. Second, it should obey a relatively predictable rela- 
tionship with nominal GDP.  These criteria quickly eliminate narrow money 
8. The Bundesbank officially acknowledges that the need for a gradualist approach to reducing 
inflation influenced its targeting decisions. It states that in setting the targets “it took account of 
the fact that price increases which have already entered the decisions of economic agents cannot 
be eliminated immediately, but only by degrees” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1989,97). 370  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
aggregates like M1. Substitution between demand deposits and near-money 
substitutes (e.g., time and  savings deposits) make this  aggregate difficult  to 
regulate.  It also induces  large  fluctuations in  M1 that  are unrelated  to  the 
course of economic activity. 
The Bundesbank  originally  settled on a construct  it termed central bank 
money (CBM). The idea underlying the construct was to develop an aggregate 
that was a weighted average of all existing monetary instruments, where the 
weights reflect the relative “moneyness”  of each instrument. The elements of 
CBM are, roughly  speaking, the sum of  currency  held  outside the banking 
system and the components of the broad aggregate M3 (which corresponds to 
M2 for the United States) weighted by the respective reserve requirement that 
existed in 1974. Thus, CBM is roughly  the monetary base minus excess re- 
serves. It differs by not including reserves against foreign deposits and by us- 
ing the 1974 reserve requirements as opposed to the current ones. The rationale 
for using reserve requirements  to weight the aggregates was that reserve re- 
quirements reasonably reflected the relative liquidity of each bank deposit lia- 
bility. 
In 1988  the Bundesbank switched to targeting the broader money aggregate 
M3. Strong currency growth in 1987 (due possibly to low interest rates) led to 
a rapid expansion of CBM. The Bundesbank felt that the broader aggregate 
was less susceptible than CBM to gyrations stemming from currency substitu- 
tion (Trehan  1988). The decision to change the target aggregate is one of  a 
number of pieces of evidence that the Bundesbank does not conduct policy on 
automatic pilot. New market developments can influence policy. 
A number of  studies have demonstrated that the relation between M3 and 
nominal GDP has been fairly stable over time (e.g., Trehan 1988). Some papers 
have argued that the early stages of reunification have not disrupted this rela- 
tionship (e.g., Von Hagen  1994; Kole and Meade 1994). Very recently, how- 
ever, there has been considerable financial innovation, patterned after what has 
occurred in the United States over the  last five to ten years.9 There is some 
possibility that this development may introduce the same kind of instability in 
M3 that the United States has experienced with its M2 aggregate. If this does 
occur, we should not be surprised to see a new target aggregate emerge. 
10.2.3  Operating Procedures 
Despite the public focus on monetary aggregates, the daily management of 
policy is concerned with the setting of  short-term market interest rates. Like 
many  other central banks,  the Bundesbank  translates  its  main  policy  goals 
(e.g., controlling inflation)  into near-term interest rate  objectives.  It in  turn 
supplies bank reserves to meet these objectives. Even in its official publica- 
tions, the Bundesbank  states (in its own oblique way) that, in the short run, 
9. For a description of how recent financial innovation is affecting the monetary aggregates in 
Germany, see German Economic Cornmenrur?:  (Goldman Sachs), no. 42 (1994). 371  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
moderating  market  interest rate  fluctuations takes precedence  over meeting 
monetary targets.1° In section  10.4 we present formal evidence that supports 
this contention. 
Until the mid- 1980s the Bundesbank manipulated short-term market interest 
rates (and bank reserves) via discount window lending to commercial banks. 
It made available two types of credit: discount and Lombard. Banks could re- 
ceive discount credit at a preferred rate, up to a fixed quota. To  meet short- 
term liquidity needs beyond the quota limit, they could obtain Lombard credit 
at a premium rate. Under normal circumstances Lombard credit was generally 
available in elastic supply. In periods of tightening, though, limits could also 
be placed on the use of this credit. 
Both the discount and Lombard rates are posted rates. The market rate that 
discount window lending most directly affects is the rate in the interbank mar- 
ket for reserves, known as the day-to-day rate or the call money rate. As in the 
United  States, reserve  management  policy  is geared  toward influencing  the 
interbank rate.” Short-term variation in this rate therefore reflects the intention 
of monetary policy. As figure 10.1 indicates, the day-to-day rate tends to fluc- 
tuate in the band fixed by the discount and Lombard rates. 
Since  1985 the Bundesbank has supplied banks with reserves  mainly  via 
repurchase agreements, which are essentially collateralized loans with a matu- 
rity of two to four weeks. Lombard credit has largely dried up. Nonetheless, 
the Bundesbank still posts a Lombard rate, mainly as a way to signal its inten- 
tions. Reserve management continues to directly influence the day-to-day rate, 
which still tends to fluctuate between the discount and Lombard rates, as figure 
10.1 illustrates. Further, the day-to-day rate also tends to move closely with the 
rate on repurchase agreements, known as the rep0 rate. Despite the midstream 
change in operating procedures, therefore, it is still reasonable to view the day- 
to-day  rate as the  Bundesbank’s policy  instrument  for the full post-Bretton 
Woods era. 
10.3  A Narrative Description of Bundesbank Policy 
In this section we provide a selective review of Bundesbank policy during 
the post-Bretton  Woods era.12  Our goal is to obtain narrative evidence on how 
the Bundesbank operates in practice. 
It is useful to divide the review into four episodes: (1) 1973-78,  the period 
10. For example, the Bundesbank states that, because commercial banks’ demand for reserves 
is “virtually inelastic” in the short run, it “has no choice but to meet the credit institutions’ need 
for central bank balances in the short run. At times it may even have to provide more central bank 
balances than are strictly compatible with the growth in the money stock” (Deutsche Bundesbank 
1989, 105). 
I 1. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) propose treating the funds rate as the operating instrument for 
U.S. monetary policy, Bernanke and Mihov (1995) present evidence in support of this approach. 
12. For additional information on the history of  postwar Bundesbank policy,  see Tsatsaronis 
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Fig. 10.1  German short-term interest rates 
immediately after Bretton Woods was abandoned and after the first major oil 
shock occurred; (2) 1979-83,  when the second major oil shock occurred and 
the United States tightened monetary policy; (3) 1983-89, the era of stagnation 
and late recovery in West Germany; (4) 1990-93,  the early years of reunifica- 
tion. After a brief discussion of  each episode, we  summarize the key lessons 
about the conduct of Bundesbank policy. 
To aid the discussion, we refer (often implicitly) to figure 10.2, which plots 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation, the growth rate of  industrial production, 
and the day-to-day rate, all for West Germany. To provide a benchmark, the 
figure also plots the analogous variables for the U.S. economy. In  addition 
figure 10.3 plots the behavior of  both the real D-marMdollar exchange rate, 
and the trade weighted exchange rate. 
10.3.1  1973-1978 
Shortly after it was freed from its obligations under Bretton Woods in early 
1973, the Bundesbank raised short-term interest rates dramatically in order to 
curtail steadily rising inflation. On a number of  occasions during this period it 
publicly announced a commitment to maintaining d tight monetary policy until 
inflation was under control (Tsatsaronis 1993). Unfortunately, later in the year 
came the first major oil shock. Thus, despite a restrictive policy through most 
of  1973, inflation climbed above 7% by  the end of  1974. Though below the 
nearly double-digit level reached in the United States, this rate was clearly high 
by West German standards. 
The Bundesbank continued to signal its intent to combat inflation. By the 
end of  1974, it had the system of  inflation and monetary targeting intact. It 
announced a target rate of inflation for 1975 of 4.5% and a target rate of mone- 373  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
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Fig. 10.2  Inflation, output growth, and interest rates: UCPZ,  U.S. consumer 
price index; CPZ,  German CPI; UZe U.S. industrial production; Ze  German 
industrial production; RFe federal funds rate; RDTDM, day-to-day  interest rate 
tary  growth of  8%. While these goals were ambitious, they nonetheless re- 
flected a gradualist approach to reining in inflation. 
As in the United States, the combined force of the oil shocks and a restrictive 
monetary policy forced the economy into a deep recession. The severe down- 
turn induced the Bundesbank to ease, along with the Federal Reserve Board. 374  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
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Fig. 10.3  Exchange rates and interest rates: RERDM$, D-MarWdollar 
exchange rate; RER EFF, trade-weighted exchange rate; RFF, federal funds 
rate; RDTDM, day-to-day interest rate 
It permitted both inflation and money growth to overshoot their targets by  1.1 
and 2 percentage points, respectively. In particular it reduced short-term rates 
and kept them low through most of the rest of the decade. While ex post real 
short-term rates were above the negative rates being recorded in the United 
States, they were nonetheless clearly below the trend for the era. 
After a brief expansion period, growth began to slacken in 1978.  At this time 375  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
the Bundesbank cited an appreciating mark to justify continued easing. In ef- 
fect the Bundesbank was easing rates to stimulate a softening real economy. 
While it is not always so forthcoming, it has acknowledged that concern for 
the real economy influenced its behavior during this period.13 
10.3.2  1979-1 983 
Just prior to 1979, macroeconomic conditions in West Germany were more 
favorable than in the United States. Output growth was roughly similar. While 
the inflation rate was still stubbornly high by West German standards, it was 
well below the U.S. inflation rate. Fortunes were reversed, however, in the eight 
years after. 
The first oil shock and the subsequent shift in U.S. monetary policy ushered 
in a return to tight money. The Bundesbank was committed to avoiding (what 
it viewed as) its earlier mistake of largely accommodating the increases in oil 
prices during 1973 and 1974 (Tsatsaronis 1993). In addition the sharp rise in 
U.S. interest rates precipitated a sharp and steady depreciation of  the mark 
relative to the dollar that lasted until 1985. 
The Bundesbank responded to these events by  raising the day-to-day rate 
from about 3% in 1979 to about 12% in the first quarter of 1981. In terms of 
basis points, this increase was similar in magnitude to the rise in the U.S. funds 
over same period. Ex post real rates rose sharply, as they did in the United 
States. 
Again, its pragmatic side showed through: the Bundesbank raised the target 
rate of inflation from 3% in 1979 to 4% in 1980. And it still permitted inflation 
to overshoot its target by  1.3%. The weakening of the real economy at the time 
was again apparently a factor in the Bundesbank’s decision making. For the 
next two years it continued the gradualist policy, tolerating above-target infla- 
tion in order to avoid further weakening a recessionary economy. 
From the period of peak inflation to the beginning of  1983, the contraction 
in real activity in West Germany was of similar magnitude to that in the United 
States. On the other hand, the drop in inflation over the same time interval was 
far more dramatic in the United States. At the start of the period the U.S. infla- 
tion rate was nearly double that in West Germany. By the end it was roughly 
equal. These facts correspond closely to Ball’s observation (1994) that the sac- 
rifice ratio in Germany actually exceeds its counterpart for the United States. 
Many have found this outcome surprising. Underlying this view is the belief 
that the Bundesbank’s reputation for fighting inflation should have made the 
transition to lower inflation less painful in this country relative to other coun- 
tries at the time. This in turn raises the possibility that the practical gains from 
establishing credibility in fighting inflation may not be substantial. Fully re- 
13. The Bundesbank states that when the D-mark appreciated “excessively” in 1978 (and also 
in 1986-87), it felt “forced to pursue a more expansionary monetary policy and allow interest rate 
reductions . . . which led to an  overshooting of the  monetary target. Otherwise the appreciation 
shock would have too much for the economy, while inflationary pressures were being moderated 
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solving this issue is well beyond the scope of  this paper, though we return to 
the matter later. 
For now we simply note two considerations. First, the sacrifice ratio could 
be highly nonlinear in practice, something for which the Ball calculation does 
not allow. One could imagine why trying to move an economy from 6% to 2% 
inflation might result in greater short-run output loss than, say, trying to move 
it from 10% to 6%.  This nonlinear relationship could resolve at least some of 
the differences in the U.S. and West German experience. 
Second, and somewhat related, at the beginning of 1979 the public percep- 
tion of the  Bundesbank’s commitment  to reduce inflation below  56%  may 
have been more ambiguous than it is today. As we have discussed, the Bundes- 
bank pursued a relatively lax monetary policy in the roughly four years prior 
to the shift to tightening. Again, we turn to this issue later. 
10.3.3  1983-1989 
While the U.S. economy  staged a strong recovery following the  1981-82 
recession, the same was not true of the West German economy. Growth was 
slightly below trend in 1983 and only slightly above trend in 1984 and  1985. 
The unemployment rate continued to rise steadily, reaching 9.3% in 1985. On 
the other hand, a product of the weak economy was receding inflation. Inflation 
was below target from  1983 to 1985. During this period the Bundesbank re- 
turned short-term nominal rates to slightly above pre-1979 levels. Lower infla- 
tion, however, implied significantly higher real interest rates than during the 
late 1970s. As we show in section 10.5, real rates during this period hovered 
slightly around and above long-run equilibrium. 
Why the West German economy (along with the rest of the European econ- 
omy) performed poorly over this period is a complex issue, another that is well 
beyond the paper’s scope. It is plausible that high real interest rates were  a 
factor. Real rates  were  similarly high in the United  States at this time. The 
United States, however, had shifted to an expansionary fiscal policy. The same 
kind of  fiscal stimulus was not present in West Germany. 
Another often-cited possibility is that the German economy was experienc- 
ing structural labor market  problems  at this  time (e.g.,  Kahn  and Jacobson 
1989). This would imply that the stagnant economy was due mainly to supply- 
side problems, that is, declines in capacity output. It is true that real wages 
grew rapidly from 1973 through 1989. The period 1982-85,  though, does not 
appear to have been a period of rapid wage growth. While we do not claim to 
resolve the issue, later we examine more carefully the behavior of output rela- 
tive to capacity and real interest rates over this period. 
In mid-1984 the United States began a systematic reduction of the funds rate 
in an effort, among other things, to reduce the value of the dollar. In early 1985 
the mark began a steady appreciation against the dollar that lasted through early 
1988. In response to the appreciating mark, the real economy weakened. Out- 
put growth declined over 1986 and 1987. Inflation fell below the 2% target. 
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its flexibility in both actions and language. Citing an appreciating mark, the 
Bundesbank eased short-term interest rates. Real short-term rates fell, though 
not to the levels of the mid- to late 1970s. Following the easing, output growth 
picked up in 1989. A strong recovery finally materialized. 
10.3.4  1990-1993 
The robust output growth in West Germany that began in  1989 continued 
through reunification in 1990, and into 1991. The unemployment rate fell over 
this period, for the first time in a decade. 
Reunification of course introduced new complexities for monetary manage- 
ment. At the time, though, the Bundesbank had two particular concerns. First, 
the robust expansion led inflation to accelerate above target in 1991. Second, 
the one-for-one currency exchange with East Germany led to a whopping 13% 
increase in the M3 aggregate within a single month. The jump complicated the 
problem of monetary targeting. Of greater concern to the Bundesbank was the 
possible consequence for inflation, especially given the large implicit subsidy 
in the currency swap. 
Fear of renewed inflation induced the Bundesbank to aggressively tighten. 
It raised short-term nominal rates above 9%. Real rates rose to the high levels 
of  the early 1980s. For the first time since Bretton Woods, both nominal and 
real rates in Germany were higher than in the United States. One casualty of 
the tightening was the EMS. The EMS collapsed in September 1992 due in 
large part to the unwillingness of other members, especially the United King- 
dom, to keep their interest rates in line with the soaring German rates. The 
tightening also had predictable effects on the Germany economy. Due at least 
in part to monetary policy, output plummeted. West German industrial produc- 
tion dropped 15% from January 1992 through September 1993.  And the unem- 
ployment rate rose nearly 3 percentage points over this same period. 
The recessionary economy prompted the Bundesbank to ease rates. The eas- 
ing, however, was modest. While both nominal and real rates declined, the 
level of the real rate remained high relative to earlier periods of downturns. We 
return to this issue in section 10.5. 
10.3.5  Bundesbank Policy in Practice: Summary of the Narrative Evidence 
The Bundesbank aggressively raises short-term interest rates in response to 
perceived inflationary pressures. An exception was the period 1975-78, when 
it maintained subnormal short-term real interest rates while inflation was above 
the desired trend, much as the United States was doing at the same time. There 
is some suggestion, even in official Bundesbank publications, that the experi- 
ence with stagflation during this period explains why the Bundesbank has been 
more vigilant about controlling inflation in the years since then. The German 
experience suggests that, once inflation starts to persist above trend, it is diffi- 
cult to bring down costlessly, even for a central bank with the reputation of the 
Bundesbank. Again, there is a clear parallel with the U.S. experience. 
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takes into account the performance  of  the real economy. While it desires to 
control inflation, it will not do so at any cost. Conversely, a soft economy with 
an appreciating D-mark normally induces the Bundesbank to ease. A case can 
be made, though, that in recent years the easings have been more modest rela- 
tive to the overall condition of the economy. 
What role does targeting play in the day-to-day formulation of policy? The 
targets do not define a rigid rule for money growth. In the period  1975-93  the 
Bundesbank failed to meet  its money-growth  target  in 9 of  19 possible in- 
stances. Rather, as the Bundesbank has made clear on numerous occasions, the 
targets are to be viewed as guidelines. They provide the policy decision with a 
clear reference point. The Bundesbank is free to deviate from this reference 
point. But it is expected to explain the circumstances that lead it to do so. In 
this way the targets place discipline on the policymaking process. 
The pattern of  deviations from the inflation and money-growth targets are 
in our view symptomatic of the implicit stabilization component in the Bunde- 
sbank policy rule. The top panel of figure 10.4 plots the target price level (in 
logarithms) implied by  the sequence of  target inflation  rates,  relative  to the 
actual price level. The middle panel does the same for the money supply. Note 
that during the high inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s the Bundesbank 
persistently accommodated overshooting of the price target by simply rebench- 
marking the path for the target price each year. That is, it made no attempt to 
target  a long-term path for the price level, presumably because it feared the 
consequences for the real economy. 
The bottom panel plots the percentage deviation of each variable from its 
target. Note that between 1979 and 1989 the two series are almost mirror im- 
ages of one another. This strong negative relationship between the price-level 
and money-stock deviations also reveals an element of stabilization within the 
policy rule. Generally speaking, when the price level significantly overshoots 
its target, the Bundesbank pursues a contractionary policy that tends to push 
the money supply below target. As we have been emphasizing, the Bundes- 
bank’s toleration of this overshooting is evidence of a stabilization concern. In 
a way, the simultaneous undershooting of the money-growth target provides it 
with a formal justification not to tighten further. 
Conversely, in periods where the price level is significantly under target, the 
Bundesbank often pushes money growth above target. The undershooting of 
the price target presumably gives it leeway to ease monetary policy. In these 
situations, as we have discussed, it usually cites an overvalued D-mark to ratio- 
nalize its aims. 
10.4  Identifying the Bundesbank’s Policy Reaction Function: 
A Structural VAR Approach 
In section 10.3 we developed a set of informal conclusions about the nature 











Fig. 10.4  Bundesbank money and price targets: CPZ%,  consumer price index 
(January 1975 = 1) percentage (log); CPZT%,  CPI target (January 1975 = 1) 
percentage (log);  ACTS, actual money supply (log; January 1975 = 1); TARGS, 
target money supply (log; January 1975 = 1); LMDEY percentage of money- 
stock deviation; LPDEY percentage of price-level deviation 380  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
by estimating policy reaction functions. Based on the previous discussion, we 
take as the Bundesbank's  policy instrument the day-to-day interest rate. Our 
goal then is to identify an empirical relationship that is useful for characteriz- 
ing how the Bundesbank adjusts the short-term rate over time. 
In general, identifying a reaction  function for central bank policy involves 
confronting two basic complex issues. First, one has to take a stand on the set 
of information to which the central bank responds. The central bank may have 
a primary goal of stabilizing inflation and output, for example. But it may (and 
in general does) take account of a far broader set of information than simply 
inflation and output. Additional  information may be useful for forecasting fu- 
ture inflation and future output. Good examples are exchange rates and com- 
modity prices. Also, the central bank may make use of intermediate targets 
such as the exchange rate or the money supply, either because it cannot directly 
observe current inflation and current output or because it desires some kind of 
commitment device. Indeed, the discussion in section 10.3 suggests that both 
the money supply and exchange rates are factored into Bundesbank policy de- 
cisions in an important way. 
Second, there is a problem of simultaneity between the policy instrument 
and the information set. The Bundesbank may adjust short-term interest rates 
in light of news about exchanges rates, for example. But, certainly, the change 
in the short-term rate will feed back into the behavior of the exchange rate. 
We  take  a two-pronged  approach  to the identification  problem. The first 
prong, which we pursue in this section, is to estimate a policy reaction function 
for the day-to-day rate that is derived from a structural VAR model of the Ger- 
man  macroe~onomy.'~  With this reaction  function we can characterize  in  a 
fairly general way  how the Bundesbank adjusts policy in response to distur- 
bances, such as supply shocks, changes in US. monetary policy, exogenous 
exchange rate shifts, and so on. The benefit  of  this approach is that we can 
address the identification  issues by employing relatively few a priori restric- 
tions (at least relative to other approaches). The cost is that because the esti- 
mated reaction function includes all the variables in the VAR it is difficult to 
interpret. Therefore, in section 10.5 we move on to the second prong, which 
involves imposing additional structure on the basic empirical model developed 
in this section. 
10.4.1 
The General Ident$cation  Strategy 
Let y, be a vector of macroeconomic variables and e,  be an associated vector 
of structural disturbances. The elements of e, are mutually orthogonal iid dis- 
turbances. They are structural shocks in the sense that they are the primitive 
Using a Structural VAR to Identify Policy Rules 
14. For some useful descriptions of the structural VAR methodology, see Blanchard 1989; Cali 
1992; Sims and Zha 1994; Kim and Roubini 1995; Bernanke and Mihov  1995. 381  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
exogenous disturbances to the economy. A very general representation of  a 
macroeconomic framework that determines y,  is 
y, = Cy, + ~A;Y,-~  + e,,  (1) 
where C and Ai are conformable square coefficient matrices, and where the 
diagonal elements of C are equal to zero. Equation 1 simply states that within 
this macroeconomy each variable may depend on its own lagged values plus 
the current and lagged values of all the other variables in the system. The feed- 
back policy rule we are interested in identifying is the equation for the element 
of y, that is the central bank policy instrument. 
The logic of the structural VAR  approach is to place a priori restrictions on 
the contemporaneous interactions among the macroeconomic variables in or- 
der to identify the coefficient matrix C. Once estimates of C are available, then 
it is possible to identify the dynamic impact of  the structural shocks on the 
elements of y, without placing any further restrictions on the data."  For the 
element of y, that is the policy instrument, the exercise leads to a policy reac- 
tion function. 
Subtract from each side of equation 1 E,-l{y,}, the expected value of y,  im- 
plied by the model, conditional on information at t -  1. Then define y, =  y, - 
E,-,(y,} as the forecast error to obtain (dropping time subscripts for conve- 
nience): 
u = Cu + e.  (2) 
In practice u is calculated as the forecast error of the reduced-form (ie., VAR) 
representation of  equation  1 (see note  15). Comparison of  equations 1 and 
2 indicates the restrictions on the contemporaneous interactions among the 
variables boil down to restrictions on the contemporaneous interactions be- 
tween the reduced-form innovations. The identifying assumptions, therefore, 
take the form of  restrictions on  C (e.g., exclusion restrictions) based on as- 
sumptions about causality among the elements of u.16 
Nonpolicy versus Policy Variables 
To organize the identifying assumptions, it is useful to divide elements of y 
into nonpolicy and policy variables. For the purpose of studying monetary pol- 
icy, we take as a policy variable any variable that the central bank may influ- 
- 
i= I 
15. To see this, note that the reduced form of equation 1 is y, = x  BJ-, + u,, where B, = (I - 
C)-'A, and u, = (I -  C)-'e,.  Since the lagged values of y,  are orthogonal to the vector of reduced- 
form disturbances u,, estimates of the B, may be readily obtained using least squares. Knowing 
both C and the B, then makes it possible to trace the impact of a shock to any element of e,  on the 
path of any element in y,. 
16. Roughly speaking, a necessary condition for identification is that the number of restrictions 
on C (beyond the zero restrictions on all the diagonal elements of  C) be at least as large as the 
number of parameters in C to be estimated. 
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ence within the current period (e.g., within the current month). This definition 
thus includes not only the central bank's direct policy instrument (e.g., the day- 
to-day interest rate), but also observable "jump" variables such as the exchange 
rate,  over  which  it  exerts  indirect influence  within  the period.  Due to the 
within-period  simultaneity, the central bank is effectively choosing values of 
all the variables that move contemporaneously. Presumably, when the central 
bank adjusts the short-term interest rate, for example, it takes into account the 
implied contemporaneous reaction of the exchange rate. 
The dual implication of our classification scheme is that nonpolicy variables 
respond only with a lag to movements in the policy variables. Output may react 
over time to a shift in interest rates, for example, but due to adjustment costs 
and so on, it does not respond instantaneously. From the standpoint of identi- 
fication, innovations in the nonpolicy variables are exogenous to the innova- 
tions in the policy  variable^.'^ To identify the equation for the policy instru- 
ment,  therefore,  we  need  to  worry  only  about  addressing  the  possible 
contemporaneous simultaneity among the policy variables (e.g., how the day- 
to-day rate responds to the exchange rate and vice versa). 
10.4.2  The Empirical Model 
Variables 
We use eight variables to describe the German macroeconomy. Five are non- 
policy variables. Of these, three are meant to characterize the state of the Ger- 
man economy: industrial production  (ip),  retail sales (ret),  and the consumer 
price level (p).  The two others reflect important external factors that influence 
the German economy: real commodity prices (cp)  (meant to capture supply 
shocks) and the U.S.  federal funds rate (8). 
The three Bundesbank policy variables are the day-to-day (i.e., short-term) 
interest rate (rs);  the real money supply (m)  (specifically the broad money ag- 
gregate M3 divided by the price level), and the real D-mark/dollar  exchange 
rate (er).  We treat the short-term interest rate as the Bundesbank's policy in- 
strument, for reasons discussed in section 10.2.3. 
17. In particular the contemporaneous exogeneity of the nonpolicy variables implies a set of 
useful exclusion restrictions on the coefficient matrix  C in  equation 2. Let u* be the vector of 
reduced-form disturbances to the elements of y  that are nonpolicy variables and let up<'' be the 
vector of reduced-form disturbances to the policy variables. Then equation 2 may be disaggregated 
as follows: 
where the diagonal elements of  the submatrices P  and CP''  are all equal to zero. The recursive 
structure implies we can separate the problem of identifying the equations for nonpolicy variables 
from that of doing the same for the policy innovations. It also implies that we can use the nonpolicy 
innovations as instruments in the policy-innovation equations. We will make use of  both of these 
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The real money supply and real exchange rate fit our policy-variable classi- 
fication, since the Bundesbank can quickly influence these variables (via its 
choice of the short-term interest rate), and because its choice of interest rates 
presumably is influenced by these variables.'8 We use the D-marWdollar rate 
since our reading of the narrative evidence suggests that it is this exchange rate 
that has had the the most influence over Bundesbank policy. 
Identifying Assumptions 
the reduced-form innovations are as follows: 
Our identifying assumptions about the contemporaneous interactions among 
Among the five nonpolicy variables, there is a recursive causal relationship, 
ordered as follows: commodity prices, industrial production, retail sales, the 
price level, and the funds rate. 
The reduced-form  money  and  interest  rate  innovations  (i.e.,  the  money- 
demand and money-supply innovations) are given by 
(3) 
(money demand), and 
(4) 
(money supply). 
The exchange rate innovation (u")  may be influenced by  any of  the other 
seven innovations in the system (i.e., we place no restrictions on the exchange 
rate equation). 
urn = a,uiP + a2urS  + em 
u"  = p,ucp + P2um  + P3uer  + ers 
In general our main results are robust to different orderings among the non- 
policy variables. Nonetheless, some specific considerations motivated the par- 
ticular sequence we picked. Over our sample, oil price shocks primarily drove 
movements in real-world commodity prices. Since oil shocks contain a large 
idiosyncratic component (due to the  Organization  of  Petroleum Exporting 
Countries [OPEC], etc.), it seems reasonable to order commodity prices first 
in the system. Also, since movements in the U.S. funds rate are unlikely to 
affect German output and prices within the period, it seems reasonable to order 
this variable last among the nonpolicy  variables. We place retail sales after 
production, based on the view that production adjusts to movements in demand 
with a lag. 
Equation 4 reveals our assumptions about the contemporaneous information 
that the Bundesbank uses to adjust the short-term rate. This equation is key. 
We make two assumptions. First, any contemporaneous information the Bun- 
desbank employs in its decision making must actually be available within the 
18. Kim and Roubini (1995) also develop a structural VAR model with a nomecursive relation- 
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period of its decision. Since news about industrial production, retail sales, and 
consumer prices become available only with a lag, we exclude innovations in 
these variables from the Bundesbank's information set. On the other hand, we 
let the Bundesbank adjust the interest rate to contemporaneous innovations in 
commodity prices, the money supply, and the exchange rate, since these vari- 
ables are directly observed within the period. The second assumption, follow- 
ing Kim and Roubini (1995), is that within the period the Bundesbank  only 
cares about the implications  of news in the U.S. funds rate for the D-mark/ 
dollar rate. Thus, the innovation in the funds rate does not enter the reaction 
function independently of  the exchange rate. 
The only other relation we restrict is money demand. Equation 3 relates the 
demand for real money balances to real output and the nominal interest rate, 
in keeping with standard convention. 
Intuitively, the identification  scheme works  as follows: Excluding  certain 
nonpolicy variable innovations from the money-supply equation 4 permits us- 
ing these innovations as instruments for the two endogenous  right-hand-side 
variables, specifically the exchange rate and money-supply  innovations. Our 
decision criterion (which was based on assumptions about the timing of data 
release)  led  us to exclude more nonpolicy  variables  than  was  necessary  to 
achieve identification. The results, however, do not rely on overidentification. 
We also consider a just identified version of the model and show that the results 
are essentially unchanged. 
Sample Period and Estimation 
Since our key identifying restrictions are based on assumptions about timing 
(e.g., variable X  affects variable  Y only with a lag), we use monthly data, the 
shortest frequency available. The sample period is August  1974 to September 
1993. We begin shortly after the dismantling of Bretton Woods and continue 
through  the early stages of  reunification. To ensure that  our results  are not 
influenced by structural changes stemming from reunification, we also con- 
sider the sample period August 1974 to December 1989. In general we find 
that the results do not change over the two different samples. 
We estimate the eight variable VARs, entering all variables in log-difference 
form except the two interest rates, which are in levels. In addition we impose 
two cointegrating  relationships:  between  retails  sales and industrial produc- 
tion, and between  real  money balances  and industrial  production.'"  In  each 
case, cointegration tests justified imposing these long-run restrictions. Finally, 
in the VAR  we include six lags of each variable, but we stagger the lags as 
follows: 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12. Convention dictates using twelve lags with monthly 
19. We include a time trend in the cointegrating vector for real money balances and industrial 
production. We  use the error-corrcction  form rather than the standard log level representation 
because in the next section we need to make use of the model's forecasts of  long-run equilibrium. 
Because the error correction imposes long-run restrictions among variables, it is better suited for 
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data to avoid problems of seasonality. However, because the sample period is 
short relative to the number of variables and because we also want to use the 
model to make long-horizon forecasts in the next section, we opted for a more 
parsimonious parameterization. 
10.4.3  Results 
We  are interested in assessing how the Bundesbank adjusts the short-term 
interest rate to disturbances to the economy, particularly in light of  the narra- 
tive evidence developed in  section 10.3. We  first report evidence on how the 
Bundesbank adjusts the day-to-day rates to within-period news. We then ana- 
lyze the response of the interest rate over time to various shocks to the econ- 
omy. In this way  we are able to characterize policy reaction function for the 
Bundesbank. 
Policy Response to Contemporaneous News 
Table 10.2 reports estimates of money-supply equation 4, which relates the 
innovation in the interest rate to the innovations in  commodity prices, the 
money supply, and the exchange rate. The point estimates are as one would 
expect. The Bundesbank lets the short-term rate rise in response to news of 
increases in inflationary pressures, manifested in either a rise in commodity 
prices, a rise in the money supply, or a depreciation of the exchange rate. None 
of the news variables is statistically significant, however. This suggests that the 
Bundesbank does not try to tightly meet monetary or exchange rate targets 
within the month. It also suggests that it is mainly lagged rather than current 
information that is fed into the Bundesbank’s policy rule. Within a given month 
the Bundesbank tends to maintain a desired short-term rate, given the informa- 
tion available at the start of the period. 
As a check that our identification scheme is reasonable, we also report the 
estimates of  the two other equations that enter the policy block, the money- 
demand and exchange rate relations. In both cases the outcomes are quite sen- 
sible. Money demand has a significant negative interest elasticity. An innova- 
tion in the funds rate causes the exchange rate to depreciate significantly, while 
an innovation in the German short-term rate does the reverse. Finally, a just- 
identified version of the model yields very similar coefficient estimates for all 
three equations. 
Dynamic Policy Response to Various Shocks 
We  next assess how the Bundesbank adjusts the short-term rate over time to 
disturbances to the economy, To  do so, we report the response to each of the 
eight structural shocks of  a subset of four core variables that characterize the 
overall  state  of  the  economy  and  policy:  industrial  production,  inflation, 
the short-term interest rate, and the real exchange rate. In addition we report 
the response of the variable that is shocked. Figures 10.5 and 10.6 show the 
results, the mean responses of the variables and their 95% confidence intervals. 386  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
Table 10.2  Structural VAR Estimates 
Overidentified Model 
u"'  =  O.O24u'8  ~  0.003~" +  e"' 
(0.021)  (0.001) 
u"  =  0.459uLp  +  12.39~"'  +  4.25~" +  e" 
(0.727)  (13.51)  (5.75) 
U"  =  0.09u'P  -  0.03u'P  -  0.03~"' -  0.50uP  -  0.01~" 
(0.12)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (1.01)  (0.003) 
(0.002)  (0.39) 
+  0.008~~~  -  0.423~" +  err 
Exactly Identified Model 
"1"  =  0.032U'P 
(0.019) 
u"  =  0.427u'p 
(0.756) 
uer  =  0.09u'p 
(0.12) 
+  0.008u" 
(0.003) 
-  0.003~" +  , . .  +  em 
+  11.45~"  +  4.04~" +  . . .  +  erb 
(0.001) 
(13.95)  (5.75) 
-  0.03u'P  -  0.03~"' -  0.45uP  -  0.01~" 
(0.04)  (0.09)  (1.01)  (0.004) 
(0.39) 
-  0.392~'" +  e" 
Notes: The sample is August 1974-September  1993. Estimation is by instrumental variables. For 
the urn  equation, the instruments are uC~',  u'p, u"", up, &', and e". For the u"  equation the instruments 
are ucp,  u'~,  ur', up,  and &'. For the up"  equation, the instruments are ucp, u'p,  ZP',  up, Un, e", and em. 
The results  are very  consistent  with  the  narrative  evidence,  in two  main 
ways. First, the Bundesbank  aggressively adjusts short-term  rates to control 
inflationary pressures. Second, it responds to exchange rate movements in a 
clearly countercyclical fashion. 
Consider the effects of a commodity price shock, as portrayed in figure 10.5. 
The outcome looks very much like the consequence of a supply shock, as one 
would  hope.  Output declines  while inflation rises. The Bundesbank sharply 
increases the short-term rate, to a point where it produces a sustained signifi- 
cant rise in the real rate. As the figure shows, the Bundesbank similarly adjusts 
the short-term rate to curtail inflationary pressures in response to output, retail 
sales, and inflation shocks. 
The countercyclical response to the exchange rate may be seen two different 
ways. First, figure 10.6 shows that a depreciation of the exchange rate produces 
a sharp sustained rise in both nominal  and real short-term rates. The rise in 
rates in turn generates a decline in output. After rising initially in response to 
the exchange rate depreciation, inflation rate drops quickly back to trend as the 
economy weakens.  It follows, of course, that an exchange rate appreciation 
does just the opposite: there is an easing of rates and an eventual expansion, 
consistent with the narrative evidence. Second, the short-term rate also rises as 387  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
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Fig. 10.5  Impulse responses to shocks: COM, commodity price; Il: industrial 
production; RET, retail sales; INFL, inflation rate; RE, real exchange rate; DTD, 
day-to-day rate 
the currency depreciates in response to an increase in the funds rate, as figure 
10.6 indicates.*" 
The response of  the economy to a money-demand shock provides support 
20. The response of the D-mark dollar rate to the funds rate shock is consistent with Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1  995). 388  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
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supply; DTD,  day-to-day rate; RE, real exchange rate; INFL, inflation rate; 14 
industrial production 
Impulse responses to shocks: FK  federal funds rate; M/P, money 
for the view that the Bundesbank treats the short-term interest rate as its policy 
instrument. Under strict money targeting, money-demand shocks should in- 
duce interest rate fluctuations that in turn affect the real economy. Figure 10.6, 
on  the  other  hand,  suggests  that  the  Bundesbank  accommodates money- 
demand shocks. Shocks to money demand have no significant affect on interest 
rates or on any other variables, except for real money balances. 389  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
Impact of  a Day-to-Day  Rate Shock 
Finally, we examine the impact of an orthogonalized innovation in the short- 
term rate. This is the issue on which the structural VAR  literature has tended 
to focus attention.z’ We interpret this kind  of exercise not as an  attempt to 
determine whether unsystematic policy shocks are important driving forces in 
the economy (we doubt that they are), but rather as a (less than ideal) way to 
show  that  policy  movements  matter  to  the  economy.22  The reduced-form 
policy-response exercises that we have just conducted do not permit us to sort 
out how much of the impact on output and inflation  was due to the policy 
reaction, for example, and how much was due to the initial shock (e.g., the rise 
in  commodity  prices).  By  examining  the  effect  of  orthogonalized  policy 
shocks, we gain a limited feel for the role of policy. 
Figure  10.6 shows that, as one would expect, the unanticipated rise in the 
short-term rate reduces output and, at least in the very short run, causes the 
exchange rate to appreciate. There is, however, no significant impact on infla- 
tion. The point estimates go in the wrong direction, but they are small and 
insignificant.  Two interpretations  are possible. First,  since the policy  shock 
produces only a modest temporary rise in short rates, it does not induce a suf- 
ficient tightening to bring down inflation. Second, the policy shock may not be 
perfectly identified; there may be some news about inflation that the Bundes- 
bank uses but is not summarized in the information set of the model. It is likely 
that some combination of these two factors is at work. 
10.4.4  Sources of Variation in the Policy Instrument 
In section 10.4.3  we analyzed how the Bundesbank adjusts short-term nomi- 
nal and real rates in response to different kinds of primitive disturbances to the 
economy. Now we ask what kinds of disturbances are important to the variation 
in rates. That is, to what hnds of disturbances has the Bundesbank responded 
primarily, particularly during critical junctures for the economy? 
Variance Decomposition 
Table 10.3 presents a simple variance decomposition of the nominal rate, as 
implied by the structural VAR. Since there are eight structural disturbances in 
the model, there are eight potential sources of variation. As the table indicates, 
aside from the “own disturbance” to the German short-term rate, four kinds of 
shocks are important: the exchange rate, the funds rate, commodity prices, and 
retail sales. Consistent with the narrative evidence, the exchange rate and the 
funds rate shocks appear to have particularly strong influence on the Bundes- 
21. For  some recent examples, see Sims and Zha  1994; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
1995; and Bernanke and Mihov 1995. 
22. We  find, as does Kim (1994), that monetary shocks are not an important source of  output 
variation in Germany. This does not mean, however, that monetary policy is unimportant. Variance 
decomposition exercises are silent on the importance of  the policy feedback rule. 390  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
Table 10.3  Variance Decomposition for the Nominal Interest Rate 
Fraction of Forecast Error Variance due to 
Horizon 
(months)  e'p  e'p  e"'  el'  &  e"  e"  epr 
6  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.16  0.01  0.57  0.16 
12  0.06  0.03  0.08  0.01  0.15  0.01  0.50  0.17 
24  0.11  0.02  0.18  0.01  0.13  0.01  0.42  0.13 
48  0.12  0.02  0.22  0.01  0.13  0.01  0.38  0.12 
bank behavior in the short run, together accounting for about a third of  the 
overall variation in the short-term rate over a six-month horizon. At twelve- 
and twenty-four-month horizons, the commodity and retail sales shocks rise in 
relative importance. Overall, the four shocks account for about half the varia- 
tion in the short-term rate over twelve months and about 60% over twenty- 
four months. 
Historical Decomposition 
How do the four shocks account for the observed temporal pattern of Ger- 
man short-term rates? Figure  10.7 presents a historical decomposition of  the 
variation in the nominal rate. The top panel shows the cumulative error in the 
forecast of the nominal rate as the sample period unwinds. This measure indi- 
cates how the short-term rate adjusted over time to shocks taking place during 
the sample. The two periods of unforecastable declines in the short-term rate 
are the late 1970s and the late 1980s. These correspond to the periods of policy 
easing cited in the narrative evidence. Similarly, the two periods are unfore- 
castable increases are the early 1980s and the early 1990s, periods where the 
informal evidence suggests policy tightness. 
In the panels below we plot the contribution to the cumulative forecast error 
by each of the four main sources (other than the own disturbance) of variation 
in the short-term rate. Again, there is a reasonable correspondence between the 
narrative and statistical evidence. Unexpected appreciations of the mark help 
account for the unexpected rates declines in 1978-79  and  1986-87.  The rise 
in rates in the early 1980s is associated with a rise in real commodity prices, a 
depreciation of the currency, and a rise in the funds rate, much as the narrative 
evidence suggests. In particular these three factors appear to account for about 
two-thirds of the rate increase that occurred at this time. 
Finally, there are some direct signs that the real economy influences Bundes- 
bank behavior. Unexpected declines in retail sales, along with an unexpected 
appreciation of the mark, contributed to the decline in rates during the mid- to 
late 1980s. Conversely, following this period, interest rates surged in large part 
as a consequence of an unexpected  sharp rise in retail sales, in conjunction 
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10.5  Adding Structure:  A Policy Reaction Function Based on Inflation 
and Output Objectives 
From the structural VAR  we are able to ascertain how different primitive 
disturbances to the economy influence the Bundesbank’s choice for the time 
path of short-term interest rates. However, the policy reaction function we ob- 
tain from this exercise-the  identified VAR equation for the day-to-day inter- 
est rate-is  difficult to compactly summarize. We learn, for example, how the 
Bundesbank has responded to movements in the D-mark. But we do not di- 
rectly  learn why. Was  inflation  the primary  consideration?  Or was  concern 
about output also a factor? 
In this section we estimate a compact and intuitive reaction function for the 
day-to-day  rate. We  do so by  imposing  additional  structure on the reaction 
function obtained from the identified VAR. We  assume that the Bundesbank 
cares about stabilizing both inflation and output. In addition we allow for the 
possibility that the Bundesbank is forward-looking in the sense that it adjusts 
policy in response to anticipation of future inflation as opposed to simply past 
inflation. Further, we take into account that in setting interest rates the Bundes- 
bank may not know the current values of inflation and output (which is consis- 
tent with what we assumed in section 10.4). 
To form beliefs about expected inflation and output relative to their respec- 
tive targets, the Bundesbank (we assume) filters the current and lagged infor- 
mation about the economy, as captured by our eight variable VARs. Thus, for 
example, we allow for movements in exchange rates to influence the day-to- 
day rate, as the reduced-form evidence suggests. But we restrict these move- 
ments to enter the policy reaction function based on the information they con- 
tain about expected inflation and output (relative to capacity). In the end we 
obtain a simple policy reaction function that relates  the movement  in short- 
term rates to two “gap” variables that reflect the position of inflation and out- 
put. As we show, this reaction  function provides  a very useful yardstick  to 
interpret the course of Bundesbank monetary policy. 
10.5.1 
Let rs, be the nominal day-to-day rate and rsr be the Bundesbank’s target for 
this rate. Let rrs, denote the real day-to-day rate. Let IT:-,  be the rate of inflation 
from period  r -  j  to t -  j  + k: equivalently, IT-,  = P,-,+~ -  p,-,,  where, as 
before, p,  is the logarithm of the price level. Also, as before, ip,  is the logarithm 
of output. Finally, let an asterisk denote the steady-state trend value of a vari- 
able. We assume that the following two equations characterize the day-to-day 
rate reaction function: 
A Day-to-Day Rate Reaction Function 
(5) rsp = E,(+,}  + rrs* + r”[E,(nf_,}  -  T*~]  + y’p[E,{ip, -  ip,*}] 
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rs, = Xrse + (1 -  ~)[iw~rS,_,]  + E,, 
,=I 
(6) 
with Cf;,,w,  = 1 and where the expectation operator E,(  } is conditioned on 
the central bank’s information set at t.23  As we noted in section 10.4, the Bunde- 
sbank observes certain variables, such as industrial production and consumer 
prices, with a one-month lag. 
Equation 5 is a slight variation of the type of reaction  function that Taylor 
(1993) used to characterize the behavior of the Federal Reserve Board under 
Alan Green~pan.~~  Underlying the rule is the notion that monetary policy is 
neutral in the long run: the central bank cannot influence the long-run equilib- 
rium values either of the real interest rate, rrs*,  or of output, @,*.  Due to nominal 
rigidities, however, the central bank does have leverage over the short-term real 
interest rate, and can thus influence the course of real activity in the short run. 
The  feedback  rule  has  a  general  kind  of  lean-against-the-wind  form. 
Roughly speaking, it has the central bank raise the short-term real interest rate 
as either inflation or output rise relative to long-run trend. Trend inflation is the 
steady-state inflation rate that the central bank is willing to accept, as is im- 
plicit in its policy rule. That is, it is the rate of inflation that the central bank is 
willing to accommodate when output is at its trend capacity value. It is thus a 
choice variable for the central bank. Trend output is the value of output that 
would arise if the economy were currently in long-run equilibrium, and is thus 
beyond the control of the central bank. 
We assume further, according to equation 6, that each month the Bundes- 
bank sets the actual day-to-day rate equal to a convex combination of the target 
rate and a weighted average of  lagged rates. We allow for partial adjustment 
because institutional factors in policymaking likely preclude the Bundesbank 
from always reaching its target at the same frequency of our data. For example, 
the effective decision-making interval may be longer than the monthly interval 
we use. In practice we find that the adjustment period is usually very fast (as 
we show later). 
An important difference between our specification and Taylor’s is that we 
allow for the possibility that the central bank is forward-looking in its concern 
for inflation, whereas Taylor instead assumes that the central bank responds to 
inflation over the past year. In particular we consider three formulations of the 
inflation gap variable: two that are forward-looking and one that corresponds 
to Taylor. 
Case 1 (forward-looking, one-year horizon): 
23. We assume further that the Bundesbank responds only to movements in anticipated inflation 
that are exogenous with respect to movements in the current short-term rate. In the estimation we 
take account of this assumption explicitly by using instrumental variables. For this reason our rule 
is not subject to the instrument instability problem discussed in Woodford (1994). In addition we 
allow for partial adjustment of the interest rate, which is also a stabilizing factor. 
24. Taylor does not formally estimate his model. He does demonstrate, however, that his infor- 
mal method of  choosing parameters seems to work quite well for the Greenspan period. 394  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
Case 2 (forward-looking, infinite horizon): 
E,{T~-,)  -  T*~  = limE,(T:} -  T*~  = E,{p,* -  p,} 
Case 3 (backward-looking, Taylor): 
Case 1 is the mirror image of the Taylor specification: the central bank looks 
one year forward at inflation, as opposed to one year back. Because the one- 
year horizon is somewhat arbitrary, in case 2 we have the central bank respond 
to expected total cumulative excess inflation. We define the latter as the ex- 
pected percentage of change in the price level relative to trend indefinitely into 
the future. This measure corresponds exactly to the percentage of difference 
between the current trend and spot price levels. Intuitively, if the price level is 
5% below trend (i.e., p,* -  p, = 5%),  then the spot price level is expected to 
grow 5% faster than trend before reverting to long-run eq~ilibrium.~~ 
Finally, for  comparison  purposes,  in  case  3  we  consider the  backward- 
looking measure that Taylor used. The expectation operator appears in this 
case only because we allow for the possibility that the central bank may not 
observe the current price level. (In equation 5 we similarly allow for the possi- 
bility that it does not observe current output.) 
We proceed by first computing the long-run equilibrium variables and the 
gap variables that enter the policy reaction  function. We use our estimated 
structural VAR to obtain values of these variables for each calendar month. In 
addition to obtaining inputs for the reaction function, we also extract informa- 
tion that is helpful for judging the position of the economy and monetary pol- 
icy, as we discuss below. 
10.5.2  Long-Run Equilibria and Short-Run Deviations: A Historical 
Decomposition of the Data 
To identify the long-run equilibrium and the inflation and output gap vari- 
ables, we return to the eight variable VARs of the German economy. We obtain 
the steady-state value for any (stationary) variable in the VAR simply by find- 
ing the k-step-ahead forecast of the respective variable, for k large. 
Long-Run Equilibrium Interest Rates and Inpation 
Figure 10.8 reports estimates of the long-run equilibrium values of the nom- 
inal interest rate, inflation, and the real interest rate. In each panel is the time 
25. We emphasize that stabilizing the gap p:  -  p,  does not correspond to stabilizing the price 
level around a deterministic trend. The empirical model of  section  10.4 on which we base the 
analysis presumes a stochastic trend rather than a deterministic trend for the price level, owing to 
the presence of  a unit root in the price level. The unit-root assumption (which is consistent with 
the data) reflects the fact that the Bundesbank accommodates changes in the price level, as the 
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Fig. 10.8  Interest rates and inflation 
series of the current value of the respective variable. To  construct a time series 
for the real interest rate, we used the observed nominal rate minus the inflation 
forecast generated by the VAR. We computed steady-state values of 6.28 for 
the nominal rate, 3.2 for inflation, and 3.1 for the real rate (simply the differ- 
ence between the two). In each instance the estimates are close to the sample 
mean (and are quite sensible). 
As we emphasized earlier, the steady-state inflation rate provides a measure 396  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
of the long-run dimension of monetary policy. Since this number is a product 
of the steady-state money-growth rate that the policy rule generates, it is ulti- 
mately  a choice variable of the Bundesbank. In this respect  we confirm the 
obvious: the Bundesbank policy rule is geared toward maintaining a long-run 
equilibrium inflation rate. 
The behavior of the real interest rate can potentially tell us something about 
monetary policy in the short run. Given that the monetary policy may influence 
the short-run but not the long-run real rate, we may interpret a rise in the real 
rate above its long-run equilibrium as one piece of evidence of a tightening of 
Bundesbank policy. This spread alone does not provide sufficient information 
to judge whether policy is tight or loose; the answer, of  course, also depends 
on the overall condition of the economy. Nonetheless, knowledge of where real 
rates stand relative to the long run is an important reference point. 
The bottom panel of figure 10.8 provides us with a sharper perspective on 
the path of policy than that in our previous analysis, Real interest rates were 
very low relative to the long-run equilibrium during the mid- to late  1970s, 
which is consistent with the narrative evidence that the Bundesbank eased dur- 
ing this period.26  Conversely, real rates were well above the steady state during 
the two main periods of tightening, the early 1980s and the early 1990s. De- 
spite economic stagnation  during most  of  the  1980s, real  rates  were  either 
above or not far below long-run equilibrium.*’ 
Inflation and Output Gaps 
We next compute the inflation and output gap variables. The top panel of 
figure 10.9 presents the two forward-looking measures of the inflation gap: (1) 
the anticipated percentage of  change in the price level relative to trend over a 
one-year horizon and (2) the same over the infinite horizon. In each case we 
use the VAR  model of  section  10.4 to compute anticipated excess inflation.28 
Interestingly, the two measures are highly correlated, with the latter typically 
being about twice the size of the former. That is, if the percentage of change 
26. One possibility is that the shift in the real interest rate from the 1970s to the 1980s could 
also reflect a permanent change in the long-run equilibrium. However, our empirical analysis indi- 
cates that the real rate is stationary over that period, which appears to rule out this possibility. 
Also, the notion that the real rate contains a unit root is unappealing as a matter of theory. 
27. We account for the influence of high real interest rates during this time by allowing the U.S. 
interest rate (which enters our VAR) to influence the forecast of the gap variables for inflation and 
output that enter the equation for the target interest rate (equation 5). 
28. As we argue in the text, the expected percentage of change in the price level over the infinite 
horizon is simply the difference between the trend log price level p: and the current log price level 
p,. To ohtainp:,  we first find the long-horizon forecast of the price level. We then use the estimate 
of the steady-state inflation rate to determine the portion of the long-horizon forecast that is due 
to the long-run drift in the price level. To obtain p:, we simply remove the estimated drift from 
the long-horizon forecast. Thus p:  is the estimate of  where the German price level would be at 
time t had been no shocks pushing it away  from the long-run equilibrium. Formally, p,* is the 
Beveridge-Nelson permanent component of the price level, as derived from the forecast of our 
eight variable VARs. 397  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
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Fig. 10.9  Inflation gaps, output gap, and real interest rates: PI GAP 12, price- 
level gap for one year; PZ GAP 240, infinite horizon price-level gap 
in the price level is expected to be 1% above trend for the next year, then it is 
likely to be a total of 2%  above trend over the indefinite future. 
The middle panel of  figure 10.9 presents our measure of  the gap between 
output and its long-run equilibrium, ip, -  ip,*.  To compute long-run equilibrium 
output, we allow for the possibility that the trend drift in output is stochastic 398  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
due to the presence of a unit root. The unit root will arise, for example, if (as we 
might expect) shocks to the level of technology have a permanent component.29 
Finally, the bottom panel of  figure 10.9 plots the real interest rate (taken 
from figure 10.8). The two main periods of monetary tightening in the sample, 
the late 1970/early 1980s and the late 1980/early 1990s, are also periods where 
expected excess inflation was highest. It is also true that during these periods 
output was above trend.3o  On the other hand, during the period of  stagnation 
during the 1980s, there were forecastable declines in inflation relative to trend 
along with below-capacity outp~t.~'  The 1992-93 recession also pushed output 
below trend. 
10.5.3  The Empirical Day-to-Day Rate Reaction Function 
of equation 5, we can express the relation for the target rate simply as 
(7)  rs: = rs* + (1 + YP)[E,{TT-,}  -   IT'^] + yrP[E,{ip,  -  @,*)I, 
where rs* (= rrs* + IT*) is the steady-state nominal interest rate, equal to the 
sum of the steady-state real rate and the steady-state inflation rate. Equation 7 
together with equation 5 then determines the day-to-day rate. We first consider 
the two cases with forward-looking inflation and then turn to the Taylor speci- 
fication. 
If we add and subtract long-run equilibrium inflation, IT*, from the right side 
Forward-Looking  Injation Gap 
day-to-day rate (obtained from substituting equation 7 into 5: 
(8) 
We  estimate, using instrumental variables, the following equation for the 
rs, = a + b,[E,[  {  IT-^} -   IT*^] 
k 
+ b,[E,{  ip, -  ip,*}]  + 2 dirs,-, + E,. 
,=I 
We  use as instruments for E,{IT:-,) -  IT*^ and E,{ip, -  ip,*},  lagged values of 
these gap variables and also the orthogonalized time t innovations in the vari- 
ables that the Bundesbank can observe contemporaneously (real commodity 
prices, the money supply, and the real exchange rate).32  We  found that k = 3 
29. Formally, ip:  is the Beveridge-Nelson permanent component of  output and is computed 
analogously top:  (see note 28). See Rotemberg (1994) for Beveridge-Nelson decompositions of 
output and prices for US.  data. See Clarida and Gali (1994) for an application of this technique 
to variety of aggregate series for OECD countries. 
30. Output was above trend during the  1980 and 1981 in part because there were declines in 
trend capacity output, possibly due to the oil shocks. 
3 1. The 1986 decline in oil prices likely also contributed to the forecastable decline in inflation. 
32. Since cumulative expected inflation and cumulative expected output growth will in general 
depend on the current interest rate, we use instrumental variables. If there is no serial correlation 
in the error term, then the lagged independent variables are legitimate instruments. It is also legiti- 
mate to use orthogonalized values of the observable shocks as instruments since, by construction, 
the orthogonalized shocks are exogenous with respect to the current interest rate. 399  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
lags of the day-to-day rate is sufficient to eliminate serial correlation from the 
estimated reaction function. 
Table 10.4 reports the results along with the implied estimates of the relation 
for the target rate rsp, given by equation 5. The top panel reports the estimates 
using the year-ahead forecast of excess inflation as the relevant gap variable, 
and the bottom panel does the same using the infinite-horizon forecast. Over- 
all, the results indicate that the Bundesbank responds significantly to expected 
inflation and output growth, and does so in the direction that one would expect. 
They also indicate that the day-to-day rate adjusts quickly to the target rate: 
only the first lagged interest rate enters significantly, and it does so with a 
coefficient that suggests reasonably fast adjustment. 
The implied equation for the target rate is informative about the implications 
of our estimates for nature of Bundesbank policy. For the “year-ahead” infla- 
tion gap, this relation is given by 
(9)  rsp = 6.06 + 0.78[E,(~r-,]  -  ~r*~]  + 0.64[Et{ip, -  ipr]]. 
The estimated equation for the infinite-horizon case is quite similar. The coef- 
ficient on the inflation gap falls in half, which simply reflects the fact that this 
gap variable is normally about twice the size of  its counterpart in the year- 
ahead case (see figure 10.9). 
We note first that the constant term in equation 9 gives an implied estimate 
of the steady-state nominal interest rate rs* (compare equations 8 and 9), which 
is very close to the estimate of 6.28 obtained in section 10.5.2. Second, the 
estimates imply that a 1-percentage-point rise in expected excess inflation in- 
Table 10.4  The Bundesbank Reaction Function 
Twelve-Month Inflation Forecast 
Dynamic Partial Adjustment Equation 
rs,  =  0.57  +  0.07(~r:~  -  P:)  +  O.O6(ip, -  ip;)  +  0.71rs,-,  +  O.lOrs,-,  +  O.lOrs,-, 
The sample is September 1974 to September 1993. Estimation is by  instrumental variables. The instru- 
ments are a constant, rs,-l.  rs,-z,  rq3,  (T,-~  -  TT-J, (i~,-~  -  @-J,  and e;p.  ef,  e:. el‘.  Box-Pierce Q(36) = 
47.88, which is significant  at the 0.09 level. R2 = 0.96. Standard error of the estimate is 0.47. 
Implied Equation for the Target Day-to-Day Rate 
rsp  = 6.06 + 0.78(p; -  p,) + 0.64(ip, -  ip;) 
(0.12)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Infinite-Horizon Forecast 
Dynamic Partial Adjustment Equation 
rs,  =  0.53  +  O.O3(p; -  p,)  +  O.O6(ip, -  ip:)  +  0.71rs,_,  +  0.11rst-2  +  O.lOrs,_, 
(0.11)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
The instruments  are a constant rs,-,,  rs,-2,  rs,-g,  (pC2 -  P,-~),  (ipr-z -  ip:-J, and e$, ef,  ey, q.  Box-Pierce 
Q(36) = 44.99, which is significant at the 0.14 level. RZ  = 0.96. Standard error of the estimate is 0.47. 
Implied Equation for the Target Day-to-Day Rate 
rsp  = 6.00 + 0.36(pt* -  p,) + 0.69(ip, -  ip;) 400  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
Table 10.5  The Bundesbank Reaction Function, Asymmetric Response to Expected 
Inflation and Disinflation 
~  ~-  -  ~ 
Twelve-Month Inflation Forecast 
Dynamic Partial Adjustment Equations 
When (a;?  -  a;'?)  > 0 
rs,  =  0.53  +  0.15(~:~  -  a;'>)  +  O.OS(ip, -  ip;)  +  0.71rs,-,  +  O.lOrs,-?  +  0.09rs,-, 
When  -  a;") < 0 
rs,  =  0.53  +  0.03(7~:~  -  +  O.O6(ip, -  ip:)  +  0.71rs,_,  +  0.10rs,_2 +  O.O9rs,-, 
The sample is September 1974 to September 1993. Estimation is by  instrument variables. The instruments 
are aconstant, rs,.i. rs,-L.  rs,~.,, (a,->  -  (ip,->  -  ip;-?),  ande;'',  e-f! e;, e?.  Box-Pierce Q(36) = 54.64, 
which is significant at the 0.03 level. R2  = 0.96. Standard error of the estimate is 0.47. 
(0.13)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
(0.13)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Implied Equations for the Target Day-to-Day Rate 
rsy  = 5.6 + 1.60(~!~  -  a;'*)  + 0.56(ip, -  ip:) 
rs:  = 5.6 + 0.28(a!* -  a:'2)  + 0.56(ip, -  ip;) 
When  - a;") > 0 
When (a;?  -  < 0 
duces the Bundesbank to raise the target day-to-day rate by  78 basis points, 
while a  I-percentage-point  increase in the output gap induces it to raise the 
day-to-day rate 64 basis points.jj Thus, the Bundesbank does appear to condi- 
tion policy on the state of the real economy, as our earlier analysis suggests. 
One surprising feature of equation 9 is the implication that the Bundesbank 
raises the target rate by less than the increase in expected inflation. One possi- 
bility is that the policy rule is asymmetric with respect to inflation. That is, it 
may be the case that if  output is at capacity, the Bundesbank does not ease 
much when expected inflation is below trend, but it tightens aggressively when 
expected inflation is above trend. In this case the low coefficient on the infla- 
tion gap could be due to the asymmetric policy response. We reestimated the 
feedback rule to allow the response to differ across positive and negative infla- 
tion gaps. The results support the asymmetry hypothesis. 
Table 10.5 presents estimates of the asymmetric policy rule using the year- 
ahead measure of excess inflation. Results for the infinite-horizon case are very 
similar. Note that the response of the day-to-day rate to expected excess infla- 
tion is positive and significant when the gap is positive, while it is not signifi- 
cant when the gap is negative. The implied relation for the day-to-day rate is 
5.60 + 1.60[E,{~f-,}  -  T*&] 
+ 0.56[E,(ip,  -  ip:)],  if E,($  ,}  -  7~*~  2 0. 
5.60 + 0.28[E,(~:-,]  -  T*'] 
+ 0.56[E,(ip,  -  ip,*)],  if E,{T:-,] -  T*~  < 0. 
(10)  rs:  = 
33. Each of the gap variables is multiplied by one hundred, implying that the respective coeffi- 
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When the inflation gap is positive, the Bundesbank raises the day-to-day rate 
160 basis points in response to a 1% rise in expected excess inflation, implying 
a real rate increase of  60 basis. On the other hand, it barely responds when 
the inflation gap is negative. Allowing for an asymmetric policy response thus 
appears to resolve the puzzle. Another interesting feature of equation 10 is that, 
for the case of positive excess inflation, the estimated coefficients on the gap 
variables are very close to the ones Taylor  Thus, after allowing for our 
modifications, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that the Bundesbank policy 
rule  during  the  post-Bretton  Woods  era  bears  a  reasonable proximity  to 
the  rule  that  Taylor employs to  characterize U.S. monetary  policy  under 
Greenspan. 
As an informal way  to judge both the fit and the implications of  our esti- 
mated reaction function, figure 10.10 plots the estimated target day-to-day rate 
rsy against the actual rate rs, for the linear policy rule described by equation 9. 
Figure 10.11 does the same for the asymmetric rule described by equation 10. 
In each case the target rate tracks the actual rate reasonably well, suggesting 
that the model provides a decent accounting of Bundesbank policy. 
It is interesting to note that, during the mid- to late 1970s, policy was some- 
what easier than the norm for the era predicted by the model, which is consis- 
tent with the narrative evidence. Specifically, the target rate was systematically 
above the actual rate over this period. Conversely, policy was somewhat tighter 
than the norm for the latter half of the sample. Particular episodes of relative 
tightness were late 1982 to early 1983, when the real economy was still experi- 
encing the effects of a severe recession, and 1992-93, the approximate time of 
the breakup of the EMS.  The relatively large gap between the actual and target 
rates during this latter period provides support for the view that the Bundes- 
bank was being unusually tough prior to the EMS  collapse. 
Interestingly, the linear model portrayed in figure 10.10 suggests that policy 
was somewhat tougher than the norm during the mid-l980s, when the real 
economy was stagnating and inflation was low. As figure 10.11 suggests, how- 
ever, this discrepancy may  be due to the failure to allow for an asymmetric 
policy  response during this period of  below-trend inflation. The nonlinear 
model, in contrast, tracks this period reasonably well. 
The Taylor Spec$cation 
We  now  reestimate the model using the difference between inflation over 
the past year and trend inflation as the relevant gap variable. We  try two varia- 
tions. The  first follows Taylor  The second allows for partial ad- 
justment. 
34. The corresponding coefficients for Taylor’s rule are  1.5 on the inflation gap and 0.5 on the 
output gap. 
35. Because Taylor used quarterly data, we measure the output gap using the quarterly average 
of our monthly data. We also followed Taylor by assuming a deterministic trend for output. The 
results are not particularly sensitive to the method of detrending output, though allowing for  a 
stochastic trend does seem to improve the fit. \, 
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Fig. 10.11  Asymmetric response of day-to-day interest rates to inflation, target 
versus actual 
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Table 10.6  Bundesbank Reaction Function: Taylor Rule Specification 
Taylor Rule 
rs:  = 6.35 + 0.71(~,  -  n:) + 0.20(ip, -  ip7,) 
The sample is September 1974 to September 1993. Estimation is by OLS. Box-Pierce Q(36) = 2,551.88, 
which is significant at the 0.00001 level. R2  = 0.43. Standard error of the estimate is  1.82. ZPT,  is the 
estimated trend in industrial production. 
(0.12)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
Taylor Rule with Partial Adjustment 
rs,  =  0.33  +  0.01(~,  -  P')  +  O.O4(ip, -  ipT,)  +  0.80rs,-,  +  0.11rst-2  +  0.03rs,-, 
The sample is September 1974 to September  1993. Estimation is by  OLS. Box-Pierce Q(36) = 50.03, 
which is significant at the 0.06 level. RZ  = 0.96. Standard error of  the estimate is 0.50. P, is average 
inflation  over  previous  twelve  months.  P* is  sample  average  inflation.  ipn, - ip, is  deviation  of 
deterministic trend ip from actual ip averaged over the previous three months. 
Implied Equation for the Target Day-to-Day Rate 
rsp  = 6.6  + 0.15(~,  -  P') + 0.84(ip, -  ipT,) 
(0.12)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
Table  10.6 reports the results. The top panel presents estimates of the stan- 
dard Taylor specification. The coefficients are of  the right  sign, though the 
coefficient on the inflation gap is too low to have the real rate move  in the 
wrong direction. More significantly, there is strong evidence of residual serial 
correlation, suggesting the possibility  of  omitted variable bias. The bottom 
panel presents the estimates for the case of partial adjustment. Including the 
lagged day-to-day rate significantly reduces the residual correlation. On the 
other hand, the coefficient on the inflation gap is no longer significant. 
Finally, figure 10.12 plots the implied target rates for the two Taylor specifi- 
cations against the actual day-to-day rate. The top panel portrays the case with 
partial adjustment, while the bottom line portrays the standard specification. 
Overall, the results suggest that the basic Taylor specification does not work as 
well as our modified version.36 
10.6  Concluding Remarks 
Despite the public focus on monetary targeting, in practice German mone- 
tary policy involves the management of short-term interest rates, as it does in 
the United States. The targets, however, do provide a reference point for deci- 
sion making. The key feature is that they provide a benchmark policy rule that 
is designed to meet a clearly articulated long-term inflation goal. While the 
Bundesbank can and often does deviate from this rule, it must always provide 
justification for doing so. By forcing this kind of focused discussion of Bunde- 
sbank decisions, the targeting provides some discipline on the policy process. 
36. We also try a variation that uses the coefficients that Taylor specified for the United States. 
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Fig. 10.12  Target interest rates implied by Taylor rules versus actual 
Except during the mid- to late 1970s, the Bundesbank has aggressively ad- 
justed interest rates to achieve and maintain  low inflation. The goal of  a low 
long-term inflation rate is paramount.  However, from a variety  of evidence, 
both informal and formal, we find that the performance of  the real economy 
also influences Bundesbank decision making. It adopts a gradualist approach 
to disinflating, and it does ease when the real economy weakens. During these 
situations it often cites other factors in public announcements-concern  about 405  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
maintaining the stability of exchange rate regimes, for example. Our results 
suggest, however, that it is implicitly pursuing a countercyclical policy. In par- 
ticular our formal analysis suggests that, for the most part, the Bundesbank has 
adjusted short-term interest rates according to a kind of modified Taylor rule: 
one that has the short-term rate adjust to anticipated inflation as opposed to 
past inflation, and that allows for an asymmetric response of the short-term 
rate to the inflation gap. In this respect there is a noteworthy parallel between 
the conduct of Bundesbank policy in the post-Bretton  Woods era and the oper- 
ation of the Federal Reserve Board since 1987. 
Despite obvious success in maintaining a low long-term inflation rate, the 
Bundesbank has not been able to make disinflation a relatively painless pro- 
cess, as the recessions of the early 1980s and the early 1990s suggest. Why it 
has not reaped measurable gains from reputation building is a major puzzle, 
one that a number of economists have noted. As we discussed earlier, the Bun- 
desbank’s accommodation of inflation during the 1970s may have influenced 
public perceptions during the early 1980s,  though it is doubtful that this could 
be the entire story. Further, since the Bundesbank aggressively pursued a low- 
inflation policy over the 1980s, this kind of explanation is less persuasive for 
the most recent recession. On the other hand, it is possible that reunification 
posed a special set of circumstances. Clearly, this general issue is an important 
topic for future research. 
We conclude with a perhaps mundane but nonetheless potentially important 
lesson from the analysis. A current widely discussed issue is whether the mone- 
tary policy  should be aimed at achieving zero inflation. We learn from the 
analysis that the Bundesbank has never tried to achieve exact price stability, 
and has instead focused on a goal of 2% long-run inflation. Concern about 
measurement error in the price index-specifically,  possible overstatement of 
inflation due to imperfect adjustment for quality improvements-is  the ratio- 
nale provided for this objective. This measurement issue ought to be a key 
concern of monetary policymakers, as it appears it is becoming in the United 
States. 
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Comment  Rudiger Dornbusch 
The paper by  Clarida and Gertler (ClaGer for short) offers a revisionist view 
of the Bundesbank. The myth has been that of an institution fighting inflation, 
with little other concern, predominantly with an M3-oriented strategy. ClaGer 
make a good case that the Buba is no different from most other central banks, 
notably the Fed. They establish a reaction function with inflation and output 
gaps as the chief determinants of an interest rate-oriented policy. Amazingly, 
M3 plays absolutely no role in the story. 
That rendition is nothing short of dramatic. After all, the Buba keeps talking 
about M3 and keeps getting entangled in the huge discrepancies between tar- 
geted M3 and the large departures of actual M3. I argue that ClaGer have done 
a great job in bringing Buba policy down to earth, but that they have not gone 
far enough. Whenever M3 goes wild, the Buba is mired in its own rhetoric. 
That is precisely when the Buba does not do the obvious, that is, cut rates in 
the midst of a no-inflation, serious-downturn situation. The first half of  1996 
is a case in point. 
I review briefly the Buba folklore, consider the ClaGer rendition, and move 
on to an attempt to reestablish some role for M3 in interpreting Buba policy 
mistakes. The point is, when common sense and adherence to M3 targets point 
in opposite directions, the Buba sometimes goes the wrong way. 
The Folklore 
The setting is shown in figure 10C.l, which reports German CPI inflation 
(for twelve-month periods). Three major inflation episodes are apparent. Com- 
ing out of the destructive experience of a hyperinflation, a monetary write-off 
in 1948, dollar dependence under Bretton Woods, and an unsuccessful encoun- 
ter with supply-shock inflation, the Buba places great weight on a firm anchor. 
A premium is placed on a simple message that allows the Buba to tie its hands 
against any temptation to pursue a long-run inflationary strategy. 
M3 is thought to offer precisely that assurance. 
The relationship in question derives from a stable long-run M3 real money 
demand. The velocity of M3, other than for a 1% per year downward trend, is 
near-constant over the medium term. Accordingly, there is a relationship be- 
tween the medium-term price level P*, the level of potential output Y*,  trend 
velocity V*, and the trend price level P*: 
(1)  P*  = V*M3/Y*. 
Such a relationship existed in the United States until Goodhart’s law caught up 
with it; in Germany it is believed still to exist. Empirical evidence for various 
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nomic Research. 408  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
-I  O.  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992  1996 
Fig. 10C.l  Germany: CPI inflation (percentage during the past twelve months) 
OECD countries is reviewed in Hoeller and Poret (1991). In the case of Ger- 
many, as recently  as 1995 the evidence of  a stable M3 equation has been re- 
viewed by the Buba (Monthly  Report, July 1995) and the conclusion remains: 
yes, there is a stable demand for M3, and as a consequence, M3 targeting is 
the basis of  a sound monetary strategy. “Most of  the empirical studies now 
available show positive  results. Hence German monetary policy makers can 
continue to count on lastingly stable money demand’ (Deutsche Bundesbank 
1995). 
With a stable money-demand equation in hand, the Buba operates its policy 
by  setting annual M3 growth corridors. The extraordinary claim of ClaGer is 
that this is just camouflage. A plain vanilla reaction  function i  la Taylor ex- 
plains what goes on, M3 is just not there! 
The Clarida-Gertler  Rendition 
The ClaGer paper reviews in careful detail the broad trends in Buba policy 
and then comes down to the hard work of identifying just what goes on. The 
central conclusion is that policy can be modeled as a reaction  function. The 
short-term interest rate is expressed as a function of the discrepancy between 
actual and long-run target inflation and the output gap. There is also a dynam- 
ics to the rate setting, which I skip here. The real interest rate target level, R, 
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where  r*  is the  long-run real  interest rate  (3%), while  IT  and  IT*  are the 
forward-looking inflation forecast and the long-run equilibrium rate. There are 
important technical features in the modeling of the inflation deviation and the 
output gap-they  are forward-looking using estimates of a variable autoregres- 
sion (VAR) model, but that is not a central issue here. The focus rather is on 
the finding that inflation gaps and the output gap explain what the Buba does 
with interest rates; M3 is just not part of the story. (Not part of the story over 
and above the role in the VAR  forecast.) Figures 10.10 and  10.11 show the 
target interest rate emerging from the reaction function as well as the actuals, 
and it is clear that the model works surprisingly well. 
The details of  the coefficient deserve attention. ClaGer experiment with 
asymmetries and their conclusion is this. 
The Buba responds to a 100-basis-point  inflation shock with a 60-basis-point 
increase in real interest rates. 
A 100-basis-point favorable inflation surprise induces only a 28-basis-point 
cut in nominal interest rates or, equivalently, a 72-basis-point increase in real 
rates. Thus interest rate policy does not fully accommodate disinflation. 
A 100-basis-point  increase in the output gap (measured by industrial produc- 
tion) includes a 64-basis-point increase in nominal and real interest rates. 
A central question in this reaction-function setting is what the long-run or 
target level of  inflation is. ClaGer find that the level of  IT*  is 3.2%. This is 
surprising because, at least since the 1980s, the rhetoric is 0-2%.  Even so, they 
refer to their finding as “sensible” and note: “the steady-state inflation rate 
provides a measure of  the long-run dimension of monetary policy. Since this 
number is a product of the steady-state money-growth rate that the policy rule 
generates, it is ultimately a choice variable of the Bundesbank.” 
Bundesbankers would be surprised to find that their long-run strategy im- 
plies a 3.2% inflation! The authors may  have  come to their unusual finding 
because their sample period includes the supply-shock period of  the 1970s, 
where the Buba was taken by surprise and spent a long time with inflation rates 
that were out of sight. That argues for using the post-oil shock sample period, 
where the recognition is made explicitly that moderate inflation in long-run 
averages requires that any overshooting be followed by periods of undershoot- 
ing. This point is particularly obvious in the 1995-96  discussion rendered in 
the Monthly Reports. There we read that, yes, inflation is safely below 2% but 
that is not an invitation for expansion. It has to be kept low and pushed down 
so that  the long-run averages come out right. Some of  this may  be brink- 
manship, but the fact is that Germany is in a slump and the Buba is not rushing 
out to give relief. In sum, modeling strategy around a target of  3.2% infla- 
tion is plainly a misreading of  what  the Buba is about, at least in  the last 
decade. 410  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
M3 Matters 
A second question about the reaction functions is just how successful they 
are. I note that, indeed, the major episodes of large rate changes are captured 
well. But as figure  10.11, for example, shows, there are major and persistent 
discrepancies between target and actual rates. Thus, in 1978-81 targets exceed 
actuals persistently, while in 1982-83  the converse is the case. Once again, in 
1991-93  actuals exceed targets significantly. The figure shows that by 1993 the 
target nominal rate would have been below 2.5%! It is tempting to believe that 
M3  has  to  do  with  precisely  these  persistent  discrepancies  between  the 
reaction-function prediction and the outcome. Consider, for example, the expe- 
rience of the 1990s. ClaGer show large discrepancies of target and actual rates 
in 1993-93.  Table 10C.l shows large overshooting of M3 relative to target. Is 
it not tempting to consider that the Buba gave some weight to the M3 over- 
shooting, and for that reason the reaction  function, which does not contain 
M3, misfires? 
It is tempting therefore to suggest a formulation well within the spirit of 
ClaGer but  with  a Buba special.  The real  interest  rate  equation  might  be 
stated as 
(3)  R‘  = y R + (1 -  y)M3 Overshoot. 
In this fashion we capture the factors ClaGer identify in the Taylor-style rendi- 
tion of the reaction function but at the same time leave room for the situation 
where M3 overshooting puts the Buba in a bind. 
An episode along these lines is surely the early part of 1996.  As figure 10C.2 
shows, after a slow year of M3 growth, far below target, in  1996 M3 growth 
took off like a bat out of hell. The Buba is bewildered: the economy with low 
inflation and no growth needs stimulus, but M3 is running wild. What to do? 
The Buba is all tied in knots, hoping that M3 will slow down, the economy 
will recover, and M3 targeting can be kept alive. 
European Monetary Union 
Another direction to look, if we want to understand just how committed the 
Buba is to monetary targeting, is the setup for Europe’s new monetary institu- 
tions. As Europe moves toward a common money, the operating instructions 
for the European Central Bank are being drafted. The Buba has weighed in 
heavily:  predictably,  with  monetary  targeting.  The  Buba  has  denounced 
inflation-targeting  U.K.-style  and  has  insisted  on  monetary-aggregates  tar- 
geting. Specifically, Buba president Tietmeyer (1996) argued that stability of 
real money demand in Europe, outside Germany, was a fact: “As a result, a 
monetary aggregate strategy, in my judgment, is the most convincing concept 
for monetary policy in the monetary union. With its use, the European Central 
Bank could inherit the reputation of  the Bundesbank. For a young institution 
such as ECB will be, this seems certainly attractive” (Tietmeyer 1996). 411  How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy 
Table 10C.l  Bundesbank M3 Targets and Outcomes 
Target  Actual 
1992  3.5-5.5  9 
1993  4.5-6.5  7 
1994  4.0-6.0  6 
1995  4.0-6.0  2 
1996  4.0-7.0 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 1995. 
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Fig. 10C.2  M3 growth targets 
Of course, the short-run instability of M3 in Germany and the controversy 
over a stable real money demand in most countries on earth make it a bit hard 
to force all new partners into the same straitjacket. Whereas Tietmeyer was 
still all-out M3, the most recent struggle with M3 in early 1996 has cooled the 
enthusiasm somewhat. Thus Issing came out with a milder version, a mix of 
both inflation targeting and room for aggregates. In a significant weakening of 
the dogma, leaning far in the direction of the U.K. plea for monetary targeting 
as the new central bank culture, he notes: “In the end, the discussion about an 412  Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler 
optimal concept cannot be an Either-or but must rather a combination of mon- 
etary aggregates strategy  and inflation targeting”  (1996, 8; see also  Konig 
1996). 
The point remains: M3 has been there, is there, and is not about to disappear. 
The German saving public  (die  Sparer) have been brought up to trust in the 
simple quantity theory, and they are not ready to believe in a new institution 
and new operating instructions all at once. 
It is appropriate to end on a quote from the Zuuberlehrling of Goethe: “Herr, 
die Not is gross, die ich rief die Geister, werd ich nun nicht 10s.” 
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